1898-1914 david s. patterson
The American peace movement in the two decades before the First World War grew rapidly in terms of the proliferation of peace societies, active membership and financial backing. From a tiny nucleus consisting of the American Peace Society and Universal Peace Union, both of which began long before 1898, peace work became a popular avocation in the first years of the twentieth century. Annual meetings on international arbitration at Albert Smiley's hotel resort on Lake Mohonk, New York, begun in 1895, were consistently attended by almost all the leading friends of international peace after about 1900; and beginning in 1907 many peace leaders organized biennial peace conferences in various American cities. In the decade before the outbreak of the European war advocates of peace also created many new peace and internationalist societies, most notably the American Society of International Law, the New York Peace Society, the American School Peace League, the Chicago Peace Society, the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes and three endowed institutions, the World Peace Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Church Peace Union. In this decade alone American friends of world peace established more than forty-five peace societies, and after 1911 the Carnegie Endowment provided the American Peace Society with an annual subvention from which it supported its affiliated peace organizations.
Yet when the European war erupted in 1914, almost all peace groups either remained aloof from the immediate issues of American neutrality or were too divided to influence the foreign policies of the Wilson administration. As a result, some of the more active peace workers, dissatisfied with the existing peace groups, cooperated with like-minded newcomers to the movement in forming still other peace organizations to deal with the pressing problems arising out of the World War.
1
Beneath the usual descriptions of the peace movement lie some important unanswered questions. Only a few historians have attempted more than a partial survey of the leadership of the peace movement for the years 1898 to 1914; even less have they analyzed its common and distinctive features. To what degree is it possible to generalize about these peace workers as a group? And since the growing popularity of the peace cause inevitably added to the variety of temperaments and programs in the movement, exactly what were their differences? Finally, what were the internal weaknesses of the movement which accounted for its impotence and eventual reorganization after 1914?
The answers require analysis of the backgrounds and assumptions of the thirty-six leaders who set the tone of the American peace movement between 1898 and 1914. 2 Such analysis will show that although the leaders of the peace movement were remarkably similar in social backgrounds and shared certain fundamental values, the movement failed to sustain its growing influence after the outbreak of the European war for two major reasons. First, the many divergent approaches to peace questions which existed in subdued fashion during peacetime surfaced under the pressures of a war-torn world and greatly accentuated the internal divisions in the movement. Second, despite the growing public interest in the peace movement, the strong elitism of the pre-war leadership which frustrated efforts to cultivate a mass following before the war facilitated the dissolution of the superficial support of the peace leaders after 1914.
II
It is not surprising to find considerable diversity in such a large group of peace leaders. Consider their ages. In 1909 when the movement was maturing, the age span ranged from the eighty-seven year old Boston minister, Edward Everett Hale, to the youthful student enthusiast at the University of Wisconsin, Louis Lochner, only twenty-two; and there were representatives of all age groups between these extremes. Nor can it be said that the age of a peace worker had any direct relationship to his position on peace questions. About the most that can be said is that in 1909 the average and median age of the peace leadership, both between fifty-four and fifty-five, was older than the leadership of the domestic reform movements of that day.
More revealing than their ages was their length of service in the peace movement. Almost all of the peace leaders who had shown interest in the peace or anti-imperialist movements before 1900 were distinctly pacific-minded in their abhorrence of international violence. They also were more sympathetic to domestic reform movements than the later participants, most of whom tended to be conservative on domestic matters, more cautious or "practical" in their promotion of international reform, and more deferential toward political authority.
3 Of the pre-1900 recruits, few besides the Quakers-Alfred Love, head of the Universal Peace Union; Benjamin Trueblood, secretary of the American Peace Society and editor of its journal, Advocate of Peace; and William I. Hull, history professor at Swarthmore College-can be considered absolute pacifists in the sense that they refused to sanction any given war. But America's war with Spain and the imperialistic aftermath deeply disturbed almost all of them. If they had not been full-fledged members of the American peace movement before 1898, they actively cooperated with peace workers in the anti-imperialist movement and moved effortlessly into the peace movement once the anti-imperialist agitation subsided. For them the peace movement became in part the proper instrument for organizing American opinion against possible future imperialist ventures and against navalism which dominated American thinking on foreign affairs at the turn of the century. They opposed the use of American military force in other lands but, unlike many isolationists who shunned America's participation in world affairs, these peace workers actively urged their government's participation in movements for permanent peace. Responding to the reality of America's emergence as a major world power, they advocated treaties of international arbitration, mediation and conciliation procedures and a broad educational campaign as rational alternatives to international conflict. A few even developed general proposals for world organization. Because they all espoused pacifism or inclined in that direction and worked for international cooperation, they might best be called pacific-minded internationalists.
on philosophical or religious grounds. Unlike those who had earlier entered the peace movement, nearly all these latecomers had fewer regrets concerning their nation's navalism and imperialism. They accepted America's rise to world power as largely inevitable and essentially béné-ficient, and they viewed the peace movement as the most useful vehicle for convincing American governmental leaders to promote a harmonious international order.
In terms of their peace ideas, these post-1900 additions to the peace movement fall roughly into three groups: generalists, world federationists and legalists. Fannie Fern Andrews, organizer of the American School Peace League; the Chicago clergyman, Charles Beals; Arthur Deerin Call, officer of the Connecticut Peace Society and American Peace Society; Samuel Train Dutton, head of Teacher's College at Columbia University; the Reverend William Short, secretary of the New York Peace Society; Lynch, Nasmyth, and Lochner most often advanced extremely broad and general proposals for the promotion of world peace. These generalists shared the positive goals of the earlier recruits in urging their government to promote international good will in its foreign policies. While they occasionally talked about the need for international organization, they rarely detailed its functions. 5 The world federationists were more clearly internationalists. These internationalists shared the peaceful aspirations of the pacific-minded and generalists, but were unwilling to wait for the conversion of the masses to the goal of world peace or of the nations' widespread acceptance of arbitration and conciliation procedures for the resolution of international disputes. They wanted the major world powers to establish permanent international institutions which would formalize and regularize the conciliation process. They talked most often of the creation of some kind of world federation. Their proposals ranged from Andrew Carnegie's general program for a league of peace composed of the leaders of the major powers of Europe and the United States, who would agree to use economic sanctions and as a last resort an international police force against aggressor states, to more specific arrangements for the creation of an international legislature which would develop procedures for preserving the peace. Hamilton Holt, Richard Bartholdt, a Republican congressman from St. Louis, Missouri, and Raymond Bridgman, journalist and author, also urged the establishment of an international executive to apply the legislature's decisions to specific controversies. 6 The third group composed of Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University; George Kirchwey, professor of international law at Columbia; James Brown Scott, international lawyer and frequent adviser to the State Department; and Elihu Root, Roosevelt's second Secretary of State and later Senator from New York, emphasized international law. Its members also were internationalists but they promoted only the creation of a world court. They were primarily legalists who argued that international congresses, like the two Hague Peace Conferences, could gradually formulate a code of international law, which justices of a world court could apply and further develop in their decisions between disputants.
With so many individuals involved in the peace movement, it is not surprising that there were numerous approaches to the peace question. Indeed, the differences among the peace workers were in some respects fundamental. Those individuals who inclined toward pacifism challenged reliance on armaments; but the other leaders soft-pedalled the armament question and in a few instances readily tolerated the large navy boosters in the Navy League. 7 In addition, the legalists questioned other peace workers' faith in arbitration treaties. In their view the arbitral process might settle many controversies, but it was no panacea and contained inherent weaknesses. They pointed out that men trained in politics and diplomacy rather than well-known jurists almost always decided arbitration cases. The art of negotiation and the spirit of compromise rather than any higher concept of abstract justice were the guiding principles in these arbitrations. Compromise was also common in arbitration because of the need to harmonize different or fragmentary concepts of international law. The legalists wanted to purge the procedures of international conciliation of their haphazard, arbitral features by creating a judicial court composed of renowned judges, appointed for life and sitting in continuous session, who would rule on the "rights" of countries in accordance with the "facts" and the established law. In their view, only the correct application, of accepted international law could bring true international justice, a prerequisite for any stable world order. 8 Tensions also existed between the legalists and the world federationists. Less confident in the wisdom of nation states to decide the rules of right conduct, the former branded schemes for an international legislature and executive as too radical. Such authoritative institutions, they pointed out, involved the surrender of national sovereignty, which nations were not yet prepared to accept. They also claimed that even if a world federation became a political reality, its use of force to preserve the peace would probably result in oppressive and unjust actions. For the legalists only renowned judges were impartial and the only acceptable sanction for their decisions was the very gradual development of "a world-wide public opinion" properly educated in the rights and duties of nations in the international community. 9 Differences even developed within each group. Among the world federationists, for example, Hamilton Holt at times favored the establishment of some kind of international police force, but Raymond Bridgman was much more skeptical of any kind of sanctions. 10 So, too, although most of the pacific-minded members feared the possible harmful consequences of an international police force, three of the strongest opponents of national armaments-Lucia Ames Mead, Boston intellectual; Edwin Ginn, a text-book publisher; and William I. Hullcautiously endorsed the creation of a small international police agency with limited powers to enforce the peace. 11 Furthermore, Jane Addams was developing a peculiar brand of pacifism which had little in common with that of other pacifists. Much as she wrote about peace, moreover, she often seemed more interested in domestic than international reform. This was suggested when in the presidential election of 1912 she supported Theodore Roosevelt, certainly no friend of the peace movement. 12 Temperamental and tactical differences also threatened the fragile unity of the movement. William Jennings Bryan's erratic opposition to imperialism, his alleged radicalism and political partisanship, his flamboyant rhetoric and his deliberate avoidance of membership in peace organizations embarrassed or annoyed some peace advocates. 13 Moreover, Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn were jealous of their reputations as leading philanthropists of peace and refused to cooperate in establishing their peace funds. In addition, Ginn, believing the peace movement should strive toward business efficiency, often disagreed with the directors of his own World Peace Foundation who through speeches and writings were more interested in uplifting their audiences to their high-minded aims.
14 But all these differences paled in comparison with the fundamentally divergent views between the pacific-minded and the leaders of the Carnegie Endowment. The latter strongly disapproved of the emotional and "radical" tendencies of the peace societies. Unlike the peace societies and the World Peace Foundation, which actively disseminated their message of pacific internationalism to literate Americans, the Carnegie trustees promoted almost entirely the extremely cautious goal of international understanding among a small group of scholars and international lawyers. Compared with the Endowment's financial support of international law and other non-pacifist groups, its subsidy to the peace societies amounted to a mere pittance, and by 1913 several Carnegie trustees began to suggest the curtailment of the Endowment's subvention unless the societies abandoned their pacifistic emphasis. 15 
Ill
The many views and temperaments in the peace movement foreshadowed the divergent responses to the world crisis after 1914, but before that date a tenuous consensus existed among the peace forces. Indeed, a dominant note of the American peace movement before 1914 was the relative absence of overt controversy. The advocates of peace frequently appeared on the same platform at peace congresses and rarely engaged in extensive debate over their different viewpoints. When they recognized their differences, they usually assumed that they were more complementary than conflicting. Especially absent was severe public criticism of their colleagues. Edwin Mead, a vigorous anti-preparedness advocate, even convinced himself that it was "ridiculous" to believe that the Carnegie trustees did not advocate the reduction of armaments although some of them were prominent supporters of the Navy League, and the leaders of the New York Peace Society deliberately attempted to minimize differences of opinion in the movement. 16 There are a few obvious explanations for this failure to emphasize their real differences. Perhaps most important, during these years of relative peace and isolation the pressures for defining and defending one's position on the peace question were minimal. Moreover, there existed a few areas of general agreement which helped to maintain an uneasy unity in the movement. First, all endorsed periodic international congresses for the discussion of questions of common interest. Second, they all assumed that the United States as a satiated and relatively secure power should take the lead in advancing specific proposals leading to a more harmonious international order. Third, although only the legalists were very precise in their definitions of international law, all conceded the importance of the development of ''law" in establishing nations' rights and duties in the world community. Finally, none opposed the establishment of a court of arbitral justice as the next, most practical step toward instituting a new world order following the Second Hague Peace Conference's endorsement in principle of this institution.
17
But there were also other, often deeper reasons for their cooperative behavior. One was their similar backgrounds. The social origins of almost all the thirty-six peace leaders were so remarkably alike that it was easier for them to tolerate different approaches to world peace than if their backgrounds had been more diverse. Despite their wide age-span and different lengths of service in the movement, from every other sociological perspective their social origins were virtually identical.
18
All but six-Bartholclt, Carnegie, Love, Lucia Ames Mead, Hannah Bailey (head of the peace department of the W.C.T.U.), and James Slayden (Democratic congressman from Texas)-had received college degrees, and nearly two-thirds also had earned professional certification in their chosen fields of law, education or religion. Since only relatively affluent families could usually afford to send their children to college in that day, these figures, together with other information on their parents' social standing, indicate that almost all the peace workers came from the middle or upper classes and, upon reaching maturity, formed an educated elite among the professional classes.
19
These similarities went beyond their social class, however. Only the Chicago Unitarian minister, Jenkin Lloyd Jones, Fannie Fern Andrews, Carnegie, Scott and Bartholclt were foreign-born, and of these only Bartholclt came from a non-English speaking nation or migrated to the United States after early childhood. Of the native Americans all but Hull, Slayden, Short and Theodore Marburg were born east of the Mississippi and north of the Mason-Dixon line. Moreover, although many were reared in small towns, they early moved to large cities whose cultural and intellectual advantages seemed inevitably to attract men and women of education and intellect; and by 1909 nearly three-fourths of the peace workers lived in six metropolitan areas-Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C. and Chicago. 20 In addition, all were Protestants and about one-half came from strongly religious households, thought seriously of the ministry as a career or were ordained clergymen. 21 In sum, the social characteristics of the thirty-six peace leaders were overwhelmingly urban, professional, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. In many instances, in fact, the sociological ties were more than casual. Among the New York peace workers Frederick Lynch had been a classmate of Hamilton Holt at Yale and of William Short at Yale Theological School. Lynch married one of Samuel Dutton's daughters and introduced Short to his future wife. 22 George Kirchwey and Dutton also had received degrees from Yale and, together with James Brown Scott and Nicholas Murray Butler, became professors or administrators at Columbia University. All of these peace workers figured prominently in the formation and programs of the New York Peace Society or the Carnegie Endowment. The same close ties existed among Boston peace workers. Before moving to New York, Dutton was a school administrator in the Boston area and frequently discussed educational problems in a Boston reform organization, the Twentieth Century Club. His exposure to many Boston friends of peace in this group first introduced him to the peace movement. Furthermore, Lynch's and Call's early contacts with other Boston advocates of peace helped to foster their growing interest in the cause. 23 
IV
But of more far-reaching importance than their social backgrounds, though in large measure derived from them, were the common attitudes and values the peace workers expressed in the movement. Most important, their approach to the peace movement was distinctly elitist. The political conservatives in the movement deliberately discouraged participation by the lower classes, but even more progressive elements gave little emphasis to them. With a few exceptions, most notably Jane Addams and William Jennings Bryan, they assumed that literate gentlemen of the middle and upper classes could more easily understand and identify with the civilized quality of their movement than the unenlightened masses. Not surprisingly, they relied upon their contacts with friends in governmental circles for their influence and shunned involvement in politics and contacts with immigrant, moderate socialist or labor groups. The high-priced dinners and formal receptions of the New York Peace Society and the Carnegie Endowment, Albert Smiley's handpicked conferences at Lake Mohonk, and the leadership of peace societies limited to educators, ministers and philanthropists exemplified this same elitism.
24
In most instances, theirs was not deliberate snobbery. Rather, reflecting the Mugwump traditions and teachings which were common among many reformers of that era, they assumed that the man in the street was an important factor in public opinion only to the extent of his ability to absorb their own ideas. Until education could enlighten the general public, these leaders assumed that they alone were the proper custodians of the peace movement. Even progressive reformers like Lynch, Lochner, and David Starr Jordan, while expressing greater faith in the populace, upheld the Mugwump emphasis on enlightened leadership and agreed that international reform would have to come from above rather than from below. Lynch, for example, assumed that ''It is the prophets and leaders who make the changes of the world. The talk of vox populi is often more of a delusion than a reality." While they regularly expounded their views on the peace question to formal gatherings, they rarely engaged their audiences in public discussion or attempted to include them in the daily operations of the peace movement. Indeed, fascinated by great leaders of the past and present, they easily tolerated the growing involvement in the movement of influential conservatives whose participation seemed to confirm the dignity of their own peace work. 25 In consequence, the peace movement increasingly acquired an aura of gentility and respectability but at the expense of widening the gap between the peace leaders and the masses.
The peace leaders managed to maintain an uneasy consensus on other values. Above all, they shared an unquestioning belief in the reality of moral values. The acceptance of moral values as the mainspring of human behavior was deeply ingrained in the American character, as the Puritans, transcendentalists and anti-slavery reformers had earlier demonstrated; and the most pacifistic internationalists frequently referred to the humanistic values of their forebears. They also derived added inspiration for their ethical values from Christian humanists and Enlightenment philosophers throughout the Western world. Unlike American ultranationalists, who had little faith in the pervasiveness of ethical principles beyond the water's edge, these pacific-minded individuals optimistically believed that these values existed universally and already exerted a far-reaching influence on the foreign policies of nation states. 26 Other international reformers were less sanguine. They agreed that the acceptance of moral values was widespread, but they assumed that they were most obviously present in their own land and to a lesser degree in other so-called civilized or Christian nations.
27
In the long run, the distinction between the pacifists' humanism and the other peace workers' more limited emphasis on civilized nations was crucial. The latter, more readily believing in the essential virtue of American conduct in foreign affairs, could more easily justify their nation's forceful intervention in the affairs of other states for the sake of reforming their policies along American or ''civilized" lines than those inclining toward pacifism, who were profoundly skeptical about the use of force in foreign affairs. During peacetime, however, this distinction caused no difficulties.
If the peace leaders had believed only in the reality of moral values in international life, they would have had difficulty in explaining why nations had resorted to wars throughout history. But they were not Pollyannas. Admitting that man was not inherently good and might even be instinctively pugnacious, many peace workers tempered their optimism with warnings about his combative instincts. James Slayden lamented that ''the spirit of the people is inclined toward war," and Holt agreed that "the great mass of men and women almost prefer war to peace." 28 Yet they stopped far short of the conclusion that mankind was therefore inevitably doomed to recurrent wars. Rather, international cooperation was still possible and worth the quest. In general, they advanced four explanations for resolving the apparent contradiction between their awareness of the persistence of international tensions and their continuing hopes for a peaceful world order.
First, the pacific-minded and a few other internationalists often blamed wars on a tiny minority of munitions makers and military men who, motivated by greed and glory, cleverly fabricated war scares and promoted wars. 29 Second, peace workers emphasized moral education. Assuming the individual had a moral sense and a capacity for reason, they stressed education as vitally important in developing these qualities. Proper education, they believed, could overcome man's ignorance, the major reason for his deviation from moral rectitude. Despite different emphases in educational philosophy, all asserted the primacy of the educator's moral function. 30 Third, they all believed that permanent international machinery would restrain man's passions and thereby reduce the chances for war. Once nations established arbitral tribunals, commissions of inquiry and especially a world court, then international controversies could be removed from the potentially wrathful populace and placed in the hands of cool-headed, impartial administrators. While promoting international agreements requiring submission of almost all kinds of controversies to the appropriate agency, in practice they accepted almost any agreement as a positive step in the long-range goal of world organization. 31 An imposing obstacle to the implementation of permanent international institutions, however, was the reluctance of governments to relinquish their freedom of action to international agencies. Many peace advocates, especially the legalists, seemed to understand the practical difficulties, but on the whole the peace workers minimized them. Reflecting their faith in enlightened leadership, they believed that a few statesmen understood the advantages of such agencies and could establish them without waiting for the education and conversion of world public opinion. The negotiation of many arbitration and conciliation treaties as well as the nations' acceptance in principle of a court of arbitral justice seemed to suggest that many statesmen were already interested in developing peacekeeping machinery.
They further argued that there was no need to invent institutional arrangements, for the American Constitution provided the perfect model for world organization. Accepting unquestioningly the superiority of the American federal system, many peace advocates naively assumed it could function effectively on an international scale. Minimizing the differences between the cultural and political harmony of the American experience and the anarchistic condition of world politics, these advocates of peace extended the analogy of the American judiciary, legislature and executive to the international sphere. 32 The international reformers' confidence in American political institutions further underscored the limits of their internationalism. While thinking they were internationalists, their faith in the unique blessings of the American experience indicated a distinct though often unconscious nationalist loyalty as well. Instead of advancing a reasoned and full-scale critique of the excessive nationalism of their day, almost all peace workers assumed that national rivalries would be a reality until foreign leaders came to adopt American values and institutions. In this way peace workers held out vague hopes for world peace in the future without risking much, if any, of their present prestige or respectability.
The peace workers foresaw no difficulties in looking to the future for vindication of their movement because, fourth and most commonly, they always linked morality to progress. They assumed that progress was a natural force operating automatically in human affairs. While they differed in the emphasis they gave to the desirability and direction of progressive currents, they all shared this faith in moral progress. Those inclining toward pacifism believed that moral progress was at work throughout the world. As evidence of this advance, they often cited the decline of major wars among Western nations in the modern era. 33 Others, more restrained and less humanistic, stressed the slow, steady enlightenment of the great powers. Marburg, for instance, believed that only the Western nations were agents of progress. Butler was more vague but emphasized that the movement toward the organization of the world was as "sure as that of an Alpine glacier." 34 The peace workers also explained progress in material terms. As the movement acquired a "practical" outlook, the pacifists' attacks on war as murderous and therefore immoral declined, while they increasingly joined with their friends in the peace movement in opposing war because it was destructive of material comforts and generally wasteful. They also agreed with them in deploring the high costs of war preparations, which burdened the populace with taxes and restricted the funds available for programs of human betterment. Yet they refused to accept militarism as a growing evil of modern life. Rather, they regarded it as an anachronistic survival of an earlier, unenlightened era and as incompatible with modern industrialism. 35 Citing the enormous productivity unleashed by the industrial revolution and the resulting expansion of international trade, they viewed these developments as essentially bénéf-icient. Commercial intercourse brought the business interests closer together, hastened the development of international amity and facilitated the movement toward the federation of the world. 36 It was no accident that businessmen began to flock to peace meetings in these years, for they fully shared both the peace leaders' elitism and their faith in material progress. They warmly praised arbitration treaties as tangible manifestations of the rational, businesslike approach to international relations, and they characterized war as harmful to the material prosperity of all nations.
37
With such a sturdy faith in moral and material progress it was inevitable that the longer world peace prevailed the stronger were the peace workers' convictions that the day of permanent peace was within their grasp. Superficial signs of progress toward their goal, especially the proliferation of international conferences and arbitration treaties, the conversion of Presidents Taft and Wilson to their high-minded aims, the reaction against the large-navy forces in Congress and the growing acceptance of the peace movement among the educated classes nourished their confidence in the future of the movement. The desire for "peace" became so infectious that even the leading boosters of the Navy League felt it advisable to proclaim their strong opposition to war. 38 Susceptible to words and gestures which provided more than a glimmer of hope for the future, a few peace leaders looked forward to the day when their movement would achieve victory. 39 Actually, most peace workers did not think in terms of the imminent millenium, for they had frequently traveled in Europe and regularly corresponded with their trans-Atlantic counterparts on the European situation, and realized that the recurrent European crises had increased the existing tensions between the rival alliance systems to the point where a future clash between them might quickly precipitate a general war. They also recognized that the Balkan wars had led to a resurgence of the military spirit and war propaganda throughout Europe. 40 But if these peace leaders understood the immediate dangers to the European peace, only Trueblood predicted the likelihood of a major war. All the other advocates of peace, perhaps unconsciously unwilling to question their faith in inevitable progress, repressed their deeper fears about the European situation. 41 The aftermath of Sarajevo seriously tested the superficial unity of the entire movement. For some of those most emotionally committed to the cause, the shock of war was traumatic. Carnegie, Trueblood and Edwin Mead fell seriously ill in 1915 and there is evidence that their illnesses were as much psychosomatic as physical in origin. 42 Not all the peace workers suffered so unhappily, although the World War undermined their most optimistic assumptions about world politics and forced a painful reassessment of their approaches to peace questions.
V
The American peace movement did not entirely collapse after 1914, but the pressures of the war brought to the surface its internal weaknesses. The failure of the peace workers was not their inability to prevent the European bloodbath which was beyond their control. They failed in the first place because of their optimistic and rather shallow assumptions about world politics. Surely they placed too much faith in the rationality of man, were too confident in their reliance on moral education, overestimated the applicability of American values and institutions and underestimated the importance of national self-interest and power in international relations. Moreover, in emphasizing inevitable progress, the peace workers tolerated the status quo in international life while still holding out hope for a gradual evolution toward a peaceful world order. Such talk tended to gloss over the real and menacing international problems of their day. In particular, while disliking excessive nationalism, they advanced neither trenchant nor persistent critiques of it. Even the few criticisms of the military and armament interests failed to probe deeply into the virulent imperial and national rivalries which fostered the armament race. Moreover, if all the peace advocates disagreed with the ultranationaliste emphasis on national power and prestige as the legitimate ends of foreign policy, they expressed a sense of mission which they could invoke to justify the forceful application of American ideals of peace, freedom and justice on an aberrant Europe. As the pressures for American involvement in the European conflict increased, only the most pacific-minded consistently resisted the temptation to approve military intervention as a prerequisite for obtaining an American version of international order.
It is important, however, to place the failure of the peace advocates in proper historical perspective. One should remember that they lived in an age far removed from the intense ideological conflicts and cataclysmic wars of post-1914 generations. Theirs was a confident era when all kinds of reform really seemed possible. Given this hopeful atmosphere in American domestic life and Americans' inexperience in world affairs, it is understandable why the peace leaders often made strained analogies between American values and institutions and international reform. Moreover, the peace advocates were not dismissed as eccentrics by the American public but represented part of a larger cultural elite which assumed moral progress and which thought in abstract, if not idealistic terms. If one insists upon the validity of moral judgments in history, then it is better to view the peace movement within the broader context of the inadequacies of that entire culture. 43 The elitist assumptions which the peace leaders shared with other leaders in America also account for the weaknesses of the pre-war peace movement. Although most of the earliest leaders consistently expressed a concern for human values, they reflected to a lesser extent the conscious elitism of many of the later recruits. In consequence, despite its growth the pre-war peace movement never developed meaningful contacts with movements for social and political change. Its rhetoric reflected this elitism. While it was always lofty in tone, it became less warmly humanistic and more coldly intellectual. Its idealistic message could arouse the interest of high-minded individuals in the peace movement, but because it expressed no urgent social message it could not sustain the active involvement of a reform-minded generation in the cause.
Even if the peace workers had surmounted their class biases, it is doubtful whether they would have aroused much more public commitment to the cause before 1914. During a time of peace and isolation as well as of a predominant interest in domestic reform, it would have been difficult to win over large numbers of people to the peace movement. Given the paucity of public commitment to their programs, perhaps they were wise in accepting the reality of the nation state and in cultivating the educated elite and political leaders to their long-range goal of a peaceful world order. A unified and concerted effort among peace leaders might have converted American and perhaps European statesmen to a workable formula for world order.
But they could not agree on a formula. Beyond a tenuous agreement on general values and a common desire for world peace, they differed fundamentally on the specific details for the realization of their goal. The pacific-minded, federationists and legalists disagreed on the proper means to the idealistic end. As long as relative peace lasted, they were able to minimize their differences. But the World War intensified interest in international institutions and soon compelled the peace leaders to define more explicitly their peace proposals for the post-war world. The war especially necessitated a thorough discussion of the thorny question of sanctions in any authoritative international body. The world federationists endorsed the use of force against nations which refused to submit their international disputes to arbitration or conciliation; but the legalists insisted upon adequate rules of law, a world court and a general agreement among nations on the specific powers of the court as prerequisites to any forceful sanctions; and some inclining toward pacifism opposed all sanctions. 44 When the peace advocates began to realize their divergent views after 1914, they gradually reorganized their movement into several autonomous organizations, each of which more clearly denned its priorities and programs. While these new groups helped to encourage President Wilson's growing interest in the principles for a new international order after the war, none had sufficient influence to convert him to a specific formula. Perhaps aware of the lack of harmony on the details of world organization, Wilson felt little compulsion to adopt any one of their plans. At the same time it is not surprising that Wilson's proposals for an international organization should fail to receive the undivided support of peace workers once they began to consider the specific features of the proposed League of Nations. Thought, 1898 -1921 (Stanford, 1969 and Warren F. Kuehl, Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920 (Nashville, Tenn., 1969) .
2. This paper will focus almost exclusively on thirty-six leaders of the American peace movement. Admittedly, any list in such a large movement is somewhat arbitrary, and scholars' interpretations of the movement will differ considerably as long as they fail to agree on a definition of a peace worker. For instance, Michael Arnold Lutzker, "The 'Practical' Peace Advocates: An Interpretation of the American Peace Movement, 1898 -1917 " (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1969 , 255-268, lists fifty-three individuals, only sixteen of whom appear in my list. Lutzker's sample differs from my own primarily because he focuses almost exclusively on the so-called practical peace workers, most of whom were tardy recruits and who managed the wealthier peace organizations, especially the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. As Lutzker admits (p. 229), in 1910 at least "twelve trustees of the Carnegie Endowment had no prior institutional connection with the peace movement," yet he includes some of them in his sample. My main standard in selecting the thirty-six was active participation in the peace movement for most if not all of these years. Indexes for determining regularity of involvement were long-term membership in peace or internationalist organizations and/or fairly consistent participation at peace congresses in the United States.
